Realizing the Right to Counsel in Guardianship: Dispelling Guardianship Myths by Cavey, Patricia M.
Marquette Elder's Advisor
Volume 2
Issue 1 Summer Article 5
Realizing the Right to Counsel in Guardianship:
Dispelling Guardianship Myths
Patricia M. Cavey
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/elders
Part of the Elder Law Commons
This Featured Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Marquette Elder's Advisor by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Cavey, Patricia M. (2000) "Realizing the Right to Counsel in Guardianship: Dispelling Guardianship Myths," Marquette Elder's
Advisor: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/elders/vol2/iss1/5
Realizing the Right to Counsel
in Guardianships:
Dispelling Guardianship Myths
Criminal defendants have basic rights
and proper defense counsel, yet
guardianship defendants often do not.
The author explores the myths behind
the "best interests" approach of
guardianship cases.
By Patricia M. Cavey
- he imposition of a court-ordered
guardianship' results in the massive
deprivation of rights.2 Whether limited
or unlimited, the result of a court-
ordered guardianship is to take away,
from an adult, the power to make fundamental life
decisions with respect to liberty, property, and
one's own life. A guardianship order transfers that
decision-making power to another adult or corpo-
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rate entity.3 The deprivation can be as profound as
the termination of the ward's life4 or the transfer of
an entire estate so that the ward can be placed in a
nursing home to preserve the bulk of the estate for
the heirs.' In many ways the deprivation of liberty
through an involuntary guardianship order is
greater than that suffered by a convicted felon.
Prisoners retain basic rights to control medical
decisions, bodily integrity, the right to conduct
their business affairs, and retain their estate. Wards
do not.
When appropriate, a guardian or conservator
can be of invaluable assistance to an incapacitated
person. However, the wrong guardian or an inap-
propriate or premature guardianship can be the
very act that triggers a chain of events leading to
the unnecessary or premature institutionalization,
causing the ward to give up hope. It may be the
event that hastens death.6 Many of us would wel-
come someone who could serve the role of protec-
tor, defender, trustee, and guardian. Unfortunately,
there is also the risk that the guardian will become
our warden and keeper.
The problem is not with the state of the law as
written but as practiced. I have had the opportuni-
ty to work as a social worker and lawyer in a state
with very progressive mental health laws,7 yet for
almost two decades, I have shared many experi-
ences with attorneys and advocates in states with
much less "progressive" laws. Over the last 10
years, many states have modernized their guardian-
ship and adult protective service statutes. Few
states fail to provide the theoretical right to either
a lawyer for the defendant or a guardian ad litem.8
However, the benefits of good model statutes or
case law protections are not realized for defendants
unless the participants in the process know, follow,
and enforce the law.
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In this article, I will explore five myths that
undermine the enforcement of the law and under-
mine even basic access to the court system. The
myths are commonly held by attorneys who prac-
tice in the field and by judges who hear guardian-
ship cases.
Myth: A Collective Belief Built Up in
Response to the Wishes of the Group9
Lawyers and judges need a resolution to a problem.
They generally will not have a continuing relation-
ship with the parties to the litigation. They will,
however, have a continuing relationship with each
other. "The group" is susceptible to myths that per-
mit lawyers and judges to process cases and take
care of the group. Unfortunately, those with the
most at stake, the guardianship defendants, are not
members of the group. In the system that purports
to protect their best interests,' 0 they are outsiders.
The very individual who is the subject of the hear-
ing often never appears at the hearing, is least like-
ly to have an attorney, or, if an attorney is appoint-
ed, is likely to have a court-appointed attorney who
is untrained and unfamiliar with the rehabilitation
potential for different disabilities and dementias
and is untrained in methods of communicating
with disabled persons.1' Even when a guardian ad
litem is appointed, that attorney may meet with the
defendant only once, briefly, before (or after) a
hearing, and will purport to represent what is the
"best interest" for the defendant. An order is
entered. A guardian is appointed. Everyone goes
home, except the defendant.
Myth 1: We're All Here to Help
On occasion, a guardianship practice seems like a
throwback to the days of the "friendly visitor." As
a senior becomes more frail and seeks out more
assistance, more people are involved in the senior's
life and everyone has an opinion on how the senior
should live. At some point a crossroads is reached;
someone starts a guardianship to gain control of
the decision-making process. Sometimes this is a
well-intentioned act; other times, it is not.
The Case of Mabel
Mabel' 2 has four adult children. She has mild
dementia but is independent in her care. Her chil-
dren all owe her a considerable amount of money
that she has loaned them over the years. Mabel has
a comfortable estate. She voluntarily requests the
assistance of a conservator on a limited basis and
for a limited purpose: to compile an inventory of
her estate and to make her current in the payment
of her living expenses. Her one goal in life is to
remain in her lovely home with her dog. Various
children file various types of legal proceedings in
two different states. All the children have different
views on what is best for their mother; all have
their own financial interest. The conservator sides
with one of the feuding children and decides to sell
Mabel's property. The conservator agrees with one
child that Mabel should reside in an out-of-state
nursing home. Without notice to Mabel, without a
hearing, without the appointment of a guardian ad
litem, this child obtains an ex parte temporary
guardianship order. The order permits a "place-
ment" to a nursing home13 and allows the tempo-
rary guardian to censor Mabel's mail, her visitors,
and even access to the telephone.
The "we're all here to help" myth serves the
needs of the judges and lawyers in the court system.
It camouflages the pecuniary interests of the chil-
dren and their lawyers because, "after all, we're all
here to help." It also makes a particular judge's res-
olution easier because blame, which is apportioned
in the simplest negligence case, need not be appor-
tioned in this case since Mabel, by her own request,
needs help. Unfortunately, the myth of "we're all
here to help" also permits the parties involved to
forget the protections of an adversary system.
Somehow it seems gentler, kinder, more humane to
think of a guardianship as being less harsh if we do
not think in terms of an adversarial court system.
However, in this case the one who could really
"help" Mabel was missing: an attorney represent-
ing Mabel. Mabel certainly had the means to hire
an attorney; she even had one at the beginning of
the case. However, because that lawyer also
"helped" the conservator by becoming the conser-
vator's lawyer early on, Mabel lost her own lawyer.
Everyone else had a lawyer. The court had the duty
to decide the case. Yet it was ill equipped to "help"
Mabel because the court did not hear from her,
directly or through her attorney. She didn't have
one. The adversarial process was not in effect. The
court did not hear from all the litigants; Mabel was
excluded.
I Know Best
The "we're all here to help" myth also serves the
needs of service providers and family members who
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do not have a financial motive for their involve-
ment. The following example emphasizes this point.
An elderly woman seeks assistance with errands
and housekeeping. The home aide assistance
increases to include help with medication and per-
sonal hygiene. The employee has opinions on how
things should be done. This leads to disagreements
with the client. The client feels that it is her house;
she's the boss. The home aide, on the other hand,
has a paternalistic attitude and believes that, as a
professional, she knows what's best. Rather than
quit her job, the home aide reports the client to
social services because, after all, the client had
requested help.
At the same time, the client's out-of-state adult
children see that their mother is spending a consid-
erable amount of money on staff to provide assis-
tance in her home. The children fear their mother
will deplete her savings. They reason that, if Mom
went to a nursing home, she could get great care
without the hassles of finding a new home care
aide. With the right financial planning, Mom can
divest her estate to the family and obtain "free"
care in the nursing home.14
Everyone has an opinion on how things should
be done. The home care agency may well have
good ideas about effective methods of in-home
long-term care. The children, in perfectly good
faith, may believe that a nursing home is best. The
client may well be justifiably resistant to leaving
her home, memories, familiar surroundings, trust-
ed neighbors, and community for life in the com-
munal setting of a nursing home. The challenge for
"the group" is to be sure that the client's best inter-
ests can be distinguished from the interests, frus-
trations, and opinions of others.
If there is a difference of opinion, who will be
the first to file a guardianship petition? If a petition
is filed, who will tell the client about the expense of
fighting the inevitable? How much money will be
"wasted" on litigation that could be spent on care
or transferred to her children? Wouldn't it be bet-
ter to compromise and move to the nursing home?
Will the judge even hear from the defendant, or do
others feel it would it be too upsetting for her to
attend the hearing.
The "we're all here to help" myth permits us to
justify our own opinions as to what help is needed.
It permits us to decide when we've helped enough
rather than using an objective measure of what the
advance directive was and how close we came to
meeting the client's goals by respecting his or her
directives as to how he or she chooses to live.
Myth 2: I Can't Hire My Own Lawyer
A variation of the "we're all here to help" myth is
the related myth that people adjudicated incompe-
tent cannot hire a lawyer of their choice. This sec-
ond myth has a superficial appeal. If the ward does
not have the ability to make a contract, one of the
most significant effects of a guardianship order,
how can a ward possibly hire a lawyer?
Like the "we're all here to help" myth, the "you
can't choose your lawyer" myth serves some col-
lective interests. It is convenient for everyone to
think of the guardian as being in the place of the
ward. Courts and service providers have, in the
guardian, a mentally competent person who has
the legal power to manage the affairs of the ward
as the surrogate decision maker. Indeed, that is the
whole purpose of the legal proceedings resulting in
the guardianship order: to grant authority to
another to make decisions for someone who lacks
capacity.
In a very real sense, a guardianship is the legal
death of the ward, stripping the ward of the free-
dom and power that adults in a free society are
presumed to enjoy. The fundamental liberty and
property rights at stake in a guardianship are also
exactly the reason why the myth does not apply to
the right to counsel.
The deprivations wrought by a guardianship
order, the massive curtailment of an adult's liberty
and the loss of control over one's property, are of
constitutional consequence.'" Because of the risk of
such a massive deprivation, it is inconceivable that
the right to hire counsel would not be constitution-
ally required as a matter of fundamental fairness
under the due process clause. 6 In light of the great
variations among guardianship statutes among the
50 states, one of the points on which there appears
to be unanimity among the states is the right to
counsel.'" Although there are differences about
who pays for the defendant's attorney," some states
providing public funding and others requiring the
defendant to pay, the theoretical right to defense
counsel is well established.
The right to counsel is often realized by way of
the court appointing defense counsel. However, a
defendant is not required to accept court-appoint-
ed counsel and may choose to hire counsel inde-
pendently.'" There is an obvious reason why the
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subject of a guardianship or protective placement
does not need the guardian's consent to hire coun-
sel. In some cases, the dispute will be between the
guardian and the subject of the proceedings. As a
practical matter, the only way a ward can end a
guardianship against the wishes of the guardian is
by initiating a contested court proceeding. °
In light of the essentially universal recognition
in the 50 states' statutes of the right to counsel, the
obvious importance of a skilled advocate when the
most fundamental freedoms are at stake, and the
obvious conflict of interests between a ward who
wants to end a guardianship and a guardian who
wants it continued, why does this myth persist?
Part of the explanation is that the constitutional
and statutory recognition of the right to counsel is
of relatively recent vintage. The leading cases on
the constitutional rights in civil commitment pro-
ceedings are less than 30 years old.21 The impetus
for much of the statutory modernization is less
than 15 years old.22 This relatively modern trend of
recognizing guardianship as an extremely serious
deprivation of freedom is at odds with the cen-
turies' old view of guardianship as a paternalistic,
parens patriae, proceeding, which ties in with the
myth that we're all here to help. If the system
works, the best help is a strong adversarial system
where differing viewpoints are sharply honed and
presented so that the court has the benefit of the
best arguments for differing positions.23
Myth 3: Defense Attorney, Guardian Ad
Litem-Same Thing
In addition to the lawyer for the guardianship
defendant, there is usually another lawyer with the
duty to "help" the defendant. Most states require a
guardian ad litem in guardianship proceedings.24 As
discussed below, the guardian ad litem is responsi-
ble for advocating for the best interests of the
defendant. In most legal proceedings, we assume
that the parties are able to determine and protect
their own best interests, and, if necessary, protect
those interests through an attorney. In guardian-
ship cases, however, because one of the critical
issues is whether the party has the ability to deter-
mine his or her own "best interests" or whether
those interests were previously articulated, there is
a distinction that must be clearly understood
between the role of the guardian ad litem and the
role of defense counsel. The roles are so different,
in fact, that for purposes of legal ethics, the roles
are presumed to conflict. The same attorney can-
not be both the guardian ad litem and defense
counsel."
Defense counsel must defend against the
guardianship, even if the guardianship would be in
the client's best interest, if the client opposes the
guardianship.26 Defense counsel is obligated by the
rules of professional conduct to defend against the
guardianship petition.27
Attorneys should recognize the distinction
between defense counsel and guardian ad litem.
The differing roles of guardian ad litem and defense
counsel are inherently in conflict. The guardian ad
litem is not the gatekeeper who can pick and
choose how the defendant's own interests will be
represented. When the guardian ad litem takes a
position contrary to the defendant's own interest,
the guardian ad litem is very much an opposing
counsel to the defendant within the meaning of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.28 Defense
counsel may not assume the role of de facto
guardian to act against the client's expressed wish-
es or instructions. 29
Lawyers in guardianship and conservatorship
litigation are not free to change roles.3" A lawyer
who has appeared as defense or advocate counsel
on behalf of a proposed ward is barred from
appearing as a lawyer in a different capacity such
as a "best interests" role as a guardian ad litem. A
recent case is illustrative of the distinction that
must be understood among advocates. In Tamara
L.P. v. Dane County (In re Guardianship of
Tamara L.P.), a Wisconsin appellate court held that
because of the potential conflict of interest, it is
reversible error, even in the absence of an actual
conflict and even if local custom permits the prac-
tice, for an attorney to appear as an advocate for
an alleged incompetent, then later switch roles to
represent a different interest, even a purported
"best interest."3 1 This holding is consistent with the
Model Rules barring representation where there is
a "substantial relationship" between a current and
former client.
In Tamara L.P., Attorney Alexander represent-
ed Tamara L.P. as defense counsel in a mental com-
mitment action. The representation was not for
long. The representation extended from the
September 2 filing of the detention petition against
Tamara L.P. to the September 18 appointment of
Attorney Alexander as the guardian ad litem for
Tamara L.P. when the detention proceeding was
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converted to a guardianship and protective place-
ment proceeding. 2 Attorney Alexander's appoint-
ment as guardian ad litem was pursuant to a coun-
ty custom of appointing a commitment defendant's
attorney to serve as the guardian ad litem when the
detention proceeding is converted to a guardian-
ship and protective placement proceeding.33
In Tamara L.P., Attorney Alexander represent-
ed to the Circuit Court, and the Circuit Court
found as a matter of fact, that Alexander did not
have confidential information and was able to
exercise independent judgment.34 The trial court
denied a motion to disqualify Attorney Alexander.
The Court of Appeals reversed, and did not
question the findings of fact that Attorney
Alexander had no confidential information and
was able to exercise independent judgment. Rather,
the court applied the "substantial relationship" test
that disqualifies an attorney from appearing in a
different capacity involving a former client in every
case where the two representations have a "sub-
stantial relationship":
Under the substantial relationship test, disqualifica-
tion does not require finding that a breach of ethical
standards or client confidences has occurred, but only
that the attorney has undertaken representation which
is adverse to the interests of a former client. [citation
omitted] We apply the substantial relationship test in
attorney disqualification cases where the attorney rep-
resents a party in a matter in which the adverse party
is the attorney's former client. We conclude that it is
appropriate to apply that test to the appointment of a
guardian ad litem in incompetency cases because the
same principles of confidentiality and propriety
apply."
In Tamara L.P., the potential conflict was the
conflicting roles between defense counsel and the
guardian ad litem, who represents the "best inter-
ests" of the proposed ward/defendant. The Court
of Appeals held that those were conflicting roles.36
The "substantial relationship" test of the ethics
rule and the analysis of Tamara L.P. is a broad, pre-
ventative, prophylactic rule. The rule of Tamara
L.P. does not turn on wrongdoing by the attorney,
or on bad faith, or on some evil design. Instead, the
rule of Tamara L.P. is broad precisely because of
the confidential nature of the attorney-client rela-
tionship and because the first client, the proposed
ward, is vulnerable. When a competent client has
the power and ability to waive a conflict after con-
sultation and consideration, a client with compro-
mised capacity may not be so able. A surrogate
decision maker-a guardian ad litem, a guardian,
or a conservator-may be appointed. But that per-
son and his or her attorney are the ones who have
the potential conflict. Thus, the rule of Tamara
L.P., which is consistent with the Model Rules,
makes irrelevant whether there is an actual conflict.
The right to counsel cannot be realized unless
the attorney is a competent advocate who main-
tains "as far as reasonably possible"37 a normal
attorney-client relationship, including the client's
right to hire the attorney of his or her choice.
Anything less results in the compromise of a client's
right to counsel.
Myth 4: The "Best Interest" Is What I
Say It Is
Most states now require that a guardian ad litem,
sometimes called a "visitor," be appointed. Just as
there is frequently confusion about the different
roles of the defendant's attorney and the guardian
ad litem, there is frequently confusion about what
precisely is the guardian ad litem's role. While the
guardian ad litem's role is often described as the
"best interests," this shorthand description confus-
es as much as it illuminates.
The guardian ad litem is not a neutral
bystander. The guardian ad litem has two basic
duties. First, the guardian ad litem is the initial pro-
fessional charged with the duty to ensure that the
guardianship defendant's legal rights are protected.
Ensuring that the defendant has proper notice of
the proceedings, understands what is at stake, and
is aware of the defendant's right to an independent
attorney to represent the guardianship defendant
often satisfies this duty. In most cases, the guardian
ad litem can rely on the defendant's attorney to
protect the defendant's rights.
In an unusual case, however, the guardian ad
litem's duty to protect the defendant's legal rights
may require further advocacy by the prospective
guardian.38 It is a basic proposition that the defen-
dant's lawyer needs to communicate with the
defendant. A trusted lawyer, such as the family
attorney who represented the defendant on real
estate matters, wills, a divorce, and similar person-
al legal problems, may not have experience with
the conditions loosely referred to as "dementia" or
the ability to communicate with a client under a
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disability. The trust relationship with a familiar
attorney is important, especially when the defen-
dant has so much at stake with the potential loss of
liberty and autonomy. Equally important, however,
may be some essentially "nonlegal" skills, such as
experience in communicating through hand
squeezes, eye blinks, or adaptive devices, as well as
an understanding of how dehydration, poor nutri-
tion, or medication affect cognition. In these cases,
it may fall to the guardian ad litem's duty to ensure
that the trusted family lawyer who may have little
experience in representing clients under a disability
be assisted by an attorney who, although unknown
to the guardianship defendant, has more experi-
ence in these essential "nonlegal" skills.
Another situation that may require additional
advocacy by the guardian ad litem, even when the
defendant has an attorney, is illustrated by the case
of Yamat v. Verma L.B. (In re Verma L.B.).39
Verma's recently divorced son moved into Verma's
home. Verma felt that her adult children were try-
ing to take her modest home and force her into a
nursing home. Verma's children filed a guardian-
ship action against her and placed her in a nursing
home. The son continued to live in Verma's home.
A guardian ad litem and a defense counsel were
appointed. As these lawyers dug into the facts of
the case, they were troubled by the gravity of the
activity not only on the part of the children but also
by the children's lawyers. The trial court appointed
a more experienced attorney to serve as an amicus
and report to the court, independent of the
guardian ad litem and the defense attorney. The
advocacy of obtaining a more experienced attorney
to assist the court in a complicated case permitted
a resolution of the case in a way that was most pro-
tective of the person with the most at stake, the
defendant. Defendant Verma required protection
not only from her children but also from her chil-
dren's lawyers and the lawyer/temporary guardian
who was employed by her children's lawyers.
The second of the guardian ad litem's duties,
and the second area in which the guardian ad litem
cannot be an innocent bystander, is in being an
advocate for the "best interest" of the ward. The
duty is to provide the trial court with information
that is not based on the self-interest of the litigants.
This does not mean, however, that the guardian ad
litem is a "free agent" rendering a personal opinion
about what the guardian ad litem thinks is best for
an incapacitated person.
The starting point in the analysis of the "best
interest" is coming to an understanding of the
defendant's wishes." Those wishes may have been
expressed in an advance directive, such as a durable
power of attorney, a "living will" or a directive
issued each year at the Thanksgiving dinner table
that the children are never to place their mother in
a nursing home. If the defendant's wishes are clear-
ly discernible and were made known when the
defendant was capable of understanding the
expression of those wishes and was not improperly
influenced, the guardian ad litem's duty in advo-
cating the best interest of the defendant is to advo-
cate those wishes.
Unfortunately, there is considerable pressure on
the guardian ad litem to comply for the smooth
operation of a court calendar. Courts are often
busy; settlements are encouraged. If the issue of
incompetency seems clear, the remaining disputes
over who is the guardian, which facility is the
placement, and what services are provided may, in
the guardian ad litem's personal opinion, seem
minor. They are not. Compared to the pressure to
resolve any remaining disputed issues, it may not
make much difference in the guardian ad litem's
personal opinion. That is exactly, however, when
the guardian ad litem's duty to advocate for the
best interest, starting from the defendant's expres-
sion of wishes, is most important. The protection
provided by the guardian ad litem, advocating for
the best interest of the defendant, is most critical
when incapacity prevents the defendant from
implementing those wishes or even expressing
them.
The defendant's preference may be for a partic-
ular person to be the guardian. That choice is one
of the most personal decisions a person can make,
literally trusting someone with life-and-death
health care choices. The choice may be about
where the defendant wishes to live. These choices
are personal to the defendant; the guardian ad
litem does not discharge his or her duty by offering
or advocating the personal opinions of the
guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem cannot
advocate "best interests" without first investigating
whether the defendant had expressed advance
directives or whether the defendant's wishes can be
discerned.
Two examples of the personal nature of these
choices are the companion cases of Community
Care Organization of Milwaukee County, Inc. v.
Elder's Advisor
Evelyn 0. (In re Evelyn 0.) and Community Care
Organization of Milwaukee County, Inc. v. Thyra
K. (In re Guardianship of Thyra K.). 4 Evelyn 0.
had an advance directive and agent pursuant to
power of attorney documents she executed. Thyra
K. also executed advance directives and an agent
pursuant to power of attorney documents. The
agents for both women were attorneys.
Evelyn wanted to remain in her apartment, but
she recognized her need for assistance. She could
afford 24-hour home care. Thyra wanted desper-
ately to remain in her home with her disabled
daughter. Her daughter would be receiving in-
home care that could have been extended for her
mother. A private agency had a different opinion,
determining that removal from their homes would
be "best" for both women. The guardian ad litem's
duty was to advocate for the advance directives.
The advocacy of "best interests" is not about the
personal opinions of the guardian ad litem, about
the convenience of the litigants, the "efficiency" of
settling things that do not seem personally impor-
tant to the guardian ad litem, or preserving the
defendant's estate for the heirs. It is about respect-
ing and implementing the advance planning of the
defendant.
Myth 5: We'll Protect You, If You Buy the
Bullets for Your Adversaries
No, Virginia, in the United States you shouldn't
have to hire a good lawyer to prosecute you, a
good lawyer for your nephew who wants your
money and a good lawyer for your niece who
wants your house and that you, the defendant with
the most at risk, must settle for the court-appoint-
ed lawyer as your "defender."
The basic rule in the United States is that the
parties to litigation are responsible for paying their
own attorneys.42 Where the government threatens
to take away important liberty interests, the public
may have a duty to pay for attorneys for defen-
dants who are indigent.43 Some statutes force a liti-
gant who has been found to have violated some
law, such as a consumer protection, fair employ-
ment, or antitrust statute, to pay attorney's fees as
part of the remedy for the violation.
One of the final vestiges of the "we're all here
to help" myth is that the guardianship defendant
should pay for all of these helpers. Some "helpers"
really are helpers; some are not. Does the self-
appointed "helper" have the legal right to charge
the defendant for the helper's lawyer? What hap-
pened to the system of services to protect vulnera-
ble adults?
With varying degrees of effectiveness, all states
have, in theory, some sort of system to protect vul-
nerable adults from abuse and neglect, which
would include self-neglect. Protection can include
services or initiating a guardianship to ensure the
availability of a decision maker for an incapacitat-
ed adult or a placement order if a particular level of
care is required. The system of protective services
for adults is a government service. Some states
require payment for the service if the client is not
indigent."
As discussed above, all 50 states recognize the
right of the guardianship defendant to be repre-
sented by an attorney. The attorney for the defense
in a guardianship case has the same duties of loyal-
ty to the defendant as the attorney for the defense
in a criminal case. Even when the defense attorney
is paid by the state, as in the representation of indi-
gent defendants charged with crimes that might
result in the deprivation of liberty of imprisonment,
it is universally recognized that the defense attor-
ney's duty runs to the defendant, not to the person
who pays the bill. Expecting a nonindigent
guardianship defendant to pay for the defense
attorney is no different from the general rule in the
United States that a party pays for that party's
attorney.
In those states that also require a guardian ad
litem, the argument can be made that the guardian
ad litem is also providing a service to the defendant
and the defendant should pay for the guardian ad
litem. Although, as discussed above, the role of
defense counsel is fundamentally different from the
"best interest" duty of the guardian ad litem, at
least it can be said that the guardian ad litem owes
the defendant some duty, especially if the defendant
does not have separate, independent counsel.
By what theory, however, does a court force a
guardianship defendant to pay for the petitioner's
attorney? The petitioner's attorney does not repre-
sent the defendant; that is the duty of the defen-
dant's attorney. The petitioner's attorney does not
represent the "best interest" of the defendant; that
is the duty of the guardian ad litem. The theory
cannot be that the defendant has some contract or
agreement to pay the petitioner's attorney's fees;
the petitioner's very premise of a guardianship pro-
ceeding is that the defendant lacks the capacity to
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make a contract.
To the extent that there is any policy justifica-
tion to force the guardianship defendant to pay the
attorney's fees for the petitioner, it tends to be
grounded on the "we're all here to help" myth.
Sometimes, the justification is the view that the
guardianship proceeding was "necessary" because
of the defendant's incapacity, and therefore should
be paid under the doctrine of necessaries.4"
Sometimes the justification is that the cost of bring-
ing the guardianship proceeding created a debt of
the defendant. Sometimes the justification is that it
just is not "fair" that the petitioner should have to
pay for the petitioner's attorney.
These justifications were rejected in In re
Evelyn 0.46 The court applied the standard rule
that parties to litigation are responsible for their
own attorney's fees. The rule on attorney's fees is
particularly appropriate, and the myth that "we're
all here to help" is particularly dangerous when
applied to fee requests by opposing counsel in
guardianship litigation. First, there is no limit on
how many litigants will seek to shift their attor-
ney's fees to the defendants. All the potential liti-
gants in a guardianship-hypothetically, the neigh-
bor who is the petitioner, the out-of-state heir, any
number of public and private corporations claim-
ing an interest in the protection of the disabled, the
bank nominated as guardian by the petitioner, and
any actual or would-be creditors--can, with more
or less good faith, assert that their particular posi-
tion in the litigation is in the "best interests" of the
proposed ward. All these potential litigants may
arguably claim that their litigation position pro-
vides some "necessary" to the proposed ward.
Standing to file a petition should not be confused
with the legal authority, or lack thereof, to shift the
costs of litigation.
The rule on attorney's fees protects the pro-
posed ward, just as it does all other litigants, from
the risk of underwriting the other litigants' expens-
es and litigation choices. In the words of the court
in Evelyn 0., "Evelyn 0. and Thyra K. were not
obligated by any legal principle ... to supply the
bullets to their adversaries, either before or after
the battle, even if the war is fought for what is ulti-
mately determined to be in their benefit. 47
Without the protection of the rule, the hope for due
process (which would include a fair hearing with
zealous advocacy to ensure that the defendant's
advance directives and choices about how he or she
chooses to live his or her life are heard) is
destroyed. Without the rule, the adversary system
is undermined.
Conclusion
Defendants in guardianship actions suffer the same
or greater deprivation of liberty as criminal defen-
dants. The general public and the actors in the legal
system understand the role and importance of
defense counsel for the criminal defendant. It is
important to question why there is such confusion
about the role of defense attorneys in guardianship
matters. Before we lock up the criminal defendant,
we make sure the he or she has the right to face his
or her accusers and put on a defense. Before we
kick Grandma out of her home, sell it, transfer her
life savings to someone else, and lock her up in a
nursing home, shouldn't she have the opportunity
to disagree with her "helpers"? Shouldn't she hear
the accusations and have an opportunity to prove
that she could continue to reside in her home with
care and adaptive equipment? What is the use of
advance planning if no one enforces the plan? At
what age or level of disability do we lose the right,
as citizens, to hear the accusations made against us,
and under what authority and process are we
deprived of the decisions we've made as to how we
choose to live out our lives?
The only hope for a constitutionally sound
guardianship system is to ensure that those with the
most at stake, the guardianship defendants, are
able to access real advocates. For those of us who
will age and be subject to this system, we hope that
our lawmakers understand the conflicts and self-
interest of those who advocate the dissembling of
the adversary system. Since we all age, it is in the
self-interest of practitioners and policy makers in
the field to develop systems in which advocacy is
fostered. Very good words on paper are just not
enough. There is too much at stake to hope for self-
activating justice because the "help" we get isn't
always the "help" we need or want.
Endnotes
1. The terminology varies slightly from state to state.
Some states use the term "guardian of the person"
to refer to the person who has the power to con-
trol daily "personal" decisions including medical
care and the ward's residence. The term "guardian
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of the estate" is used to refer to the person who
controls finances and property. Some states use the
term "guardian" for the "guardian of the person"
concept and the term "conservator" for the
"guardian of the estate" concept. Some states pre-
fer the term "conservatorship" to refer to volun-
tary proceedings initiated by a "competent" person
who seeks the assistance of someone to take over
certain duties such as managing the "conservatees"
finances. This article uses the term "guardian" to
refer to the person or corporation that controls
either the "personal" decisions or the "property"
decisions. It is presumed that someone other than
the defendant/ward initiated the legal proceeding
to establish the guardianship. The terms "defen-
dant" and "ward" are used interchangeably. The
reference to defendant is an attempt to strengthen
the promise of the adversarial system (if truly
adverse, justice will prevail) for those subject to it.
2. Most jurisdictions provide for limited guardian-
ships in which a ward specifically retains certain
rights, such as the right to vote or to marry. Many
states also provide for a voluntary proceeding, and
the terms "conservatorship" and "voluntary
guardianship" denote a proceeding in which the
ward (as opposed to a petitioner/plaintiff) requests
assistance from the court. The voluntary proceed-
ing enables an individual to seek assistance without
a court's factual finding of incompetency. In theory,
this would permit an easier standard of review to
dismiss the voluntary proceeding if the ward/con-
servatee decides the request for voluntary assis-
tance is no longer desired.
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (6th ed.) defines
guardian as "a person lawfully invested with the
power, and charged with the duty, of taking care of
the person and managing the property and rights
of another person.., who is considered incapable
of administering his own affairs." THE AMEICAN
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 537 (1969) lists the following
synonyms for guardian: protector, defender,
trustee, warden, and keeper.
4. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
5. See, e.g., In re F.E.H., 453 N.W 882 (Wis. 1990).
There is, of course, the inherent conflict of interest
between the heir's interest in preserving the estate
(his or her inheritance) and using the estate to pro-
vide services in the least restrictive environment,
since public benefits are readily available for nurs-
ing home care but are not available for less restric-
tive community care. See generally State ex rel.
Watts v. Combined Community Srvs. Bd. of
Milwaukee, 362 N.W.2d 104 (Wis. 1985).
6. Thyra, the defendant in Community Care Org. v.
Milwaukee County (In re Guardianship of Thyra
K.), the companion case to Community Care Org.
of Milwaukee County v. Evelyn 0. (In re Evelyn
0.), 571 N.W.2d 700 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), was
an elderly woman who lived with her disabled
adult daughter. Her daughter's disabling neurologi-
cal condition prevented her from lifting her arms
or transferring herself from her wheelchair. Thyra's
life was dedicated to caring for her daughter. Her
primary concern was the need to return home so
she could ensure that her daughter was properly
cared for in their home. Mother and daughter
could have shared home care that was being estab-
lished for her daughter. Her daughter died, howev-
er, while Thyra was in the custody of the nursing
home. Her daughter had fallen out of her wheel-
chair and was discovered by a home care aide who
was reporting to work at the home after the New
Year's holiday. Thyra's fear had come true: Her
daughter died without her mother's care. Thyra did
not return home; she died during the course of the
litigation.
7. See generally Wis. STATS. SS 51.001, 55.001; CHS.
51, 55, 880. The statutes comprising the compre-
hensive protective service system in Wisconsin were
rewritten or developed in response to Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order
on remand, 379 E Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S.
957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F.
Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (successful constitu-
tional challenge to involuntary commitment
statutes). See also Agnes T. v. Milwaukee County
(In re Agnes T.), 525 N.W.2d 268 (Wis. 1995)
(guardians cannot institutionalize wards without
court approval; the role of the guardian ad litem
includes the affirmative right to petition the court
to protect the best interest); State ex rel. Watts v.
Combined Community Srvs. Bd., 362 N.W2d 104
(Wis. 1985) (successful equal protection challenge
requiring that the subject of a guardianship and
protective placement receive periodic court review
of the placement); Community Care Org. of
Milwaukee County v. Evelyn 0. (In re Evelyn 0.),
571 N.W.2d 700 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (defendants
in guardianship actions cannot be required to fund
the litigation of their adversaries; the American
Rule on attorney fees applies to guardianship
cases); In re J.G.S., 465 N.W2d 227 (Wis. Ct. App.
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1990) (ward has the right to community placement
regardless of whether the services currently exist).
8. See A. Frank Johns, Ten Years After: Where Is the
Constitutional Crisis with Procedural Safeguards
and Due Process in Guardianship Adjudication?, 7
ELDER L. J. 33, 110-52 (1999); see infra publishing
charts by Sally B. Hurme, Steps to Enhance
Guardianship Monitoring (1991).
9. See THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICIONARY 805
(1969).
10. The analysis of "best interest" starts with the
advance directive of the ward. If the ward's wishes
were not explicit, the question becomes whether
they can be discerned. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir.,
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990);
Spahn v. Eisenberg (In re Edna M.F.), 563 N.W.2d
485 (Wis. 1997); In re Guardianship of L.W., 482
N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992).
11. An interesting and helpful analysis would be the
level of experience and training of court-appointed
counsel in guardianship proceedings as opposed to
the level of expertise of petitioning attorneys or
attorneys hired to prosecute guardianships. The
level of compensation for court appointments ($40
to $70 per hour) makes a legal practice of court
appointments economically prohibitive for most
practitioners. In Wisconsin, the prosecution of a
guardianship is a government protective service;
however, the practice has shifted in the last 10
years to private attorneys petitioning for guardian-
ships because the private bar has been able to
establish a lucrative practice of obtaining market-
rate attorney fees for their petitions.
12. The examples in this article are based on actual
cases.
13. Wisconsin law does not "permit" this type of
order, but it was obtained. In Wisconsin, a statute
allows a temporary guardianship hearing to be
held on shortened notice. See Wis. STATS. S S
880.15, 880.33. The appointment of a guardian ad
litem is also required. Wisconsin law permits the
placement of an individual, on an emergency basis,
for his or her protection, in a nursing home or less
restrictive facility. See Wis. STAT. S 55.06 (10)(a).
Again, a hearing within 72 hours is required, as is
the appointment of a guardian ad litem. See WIs.
STAT. § 55.06(11)(b). Wisconsin law also specifical-
ly forbids the placement of a ward in a nursing
home without a protective placement proceeding in
which, at a hearing, the placement needs of the
proposed ward and level of restrictiveness of that
placement would be specifically addressed. See
Agnes T. v. Milwaukee County (In re Guardianship
of Agnes T.), 525 N.W.2d 268, 269 (Wis. 1995).
See also Wis. STAT. § 55.05(5)(b).
14. Medicaid funds nursing home care for eligible
recipients. There are limited waivers for home care;
however, home care is not a covered service as of
right and is an extremely difficult benefit to obtain
especially when more than a few hours of care per
week is required. Home care is easily obtained
when an individual has private funds to pay for the
care. See also State ex rel. Watts v. Combined
Community Srvs. Bd., 362 N.W.2d 104, 110 (Wis.
1985).
15. See generally Vicki Gottlich, Zealous Advocacy for
the Defendant in Adult Guardianship Cases, 29
CLEARINGHOUSE REV., 879 (1996).
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doctrine of necessaries. See Flessas v. Marine Nat'l
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Hayes), 98 N.W.2d 430, 431 (Wis. 1959). There
may be some cases in which the guardian has pro-
vided defense counsel acceptable to the ward and
the ward's separate contract is not "necessary."
The right to have an attorney of the ward's choos-
ing, however, is a right that the guardian cannot
control.
19. A ward recently hired me upon the suggestion of
her guardian to serve as defense counsel for the
ward. The ward has been subjected to repeated
challenges to her limited guardianship by a dys-
functional family member. Every time an action is
filed, defense counsel and a guardian ad litem are
appointed. Each time, there is a different set of
court-appointed attorneys. It is the ward's and
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